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Victims in Life, Victims in Death—Keeping Burial
Rights Out of the Hands of Slayers
INTRODUCTION
It often takes tragedy to bring about change. In 2009, Constance
Shepherd was brutally murdered at the hands of her husband,
Stephen Shepherd.1 Her body was found in their New York home—
her throat slashed by a medieval-style sword.2 While still grieving
the loss of their loved one, Constance’s surviving family members
were victimized yet again:3 As Constance’s surviving spouse,
Stephen Shepherd had the sole right under New York law to control
the disposition of her remains,4 despite being charged with her
murder.5 Contrary to her family’s wishes,6 Shepherd left
Constance’s body in the morgue for more than a month before
having his attorney cremate and bury her remains near his favorite
fishing spot, hundreds of miles away from her family and home in
New York.7
Copyright 2013, by MINIA E. BREMENSTUL.
1. Dean G. Skelos, Senate Passes Bill to Protect Remains of Crime Victims,
NY STATE SENATE (May 14, 2012), http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/senate
-passes-bill-protect-remains-crime-victims-0.
2. Rich Newberg, Man Pleads Guilty in Death of His Wife, WIVB.COM
(Oct. 13, 2009, 7:17 PM), http://www.wivb.com/dpp/news/crime/Man_pleads
_guilty_in_death_of_his_wife_20091013.
3. “Homicide is a crime with more than one victim.” OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRST RESPONSE TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A
GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 53 (2010), available at
http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/pdftxt/2010FirstResponseGuidebook.pdf
(referring to survivors of homicide victims).
4. “Disposition” or “final disposition” refers to the lawful disposing of a
dead body, which may include burial, interment, cremation, anatomical donation,
or other authorized disposition. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102(a)(2)(C)
(Westlaw 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005(32) (Westlaw 2013); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013).
5. Skelos, supra note 1. Shepherd pleaded guilty to manslaughter and agreed
to a 21-year sentence. Newberg, supra note 2.
6. Constance’s family objected to Shepherd’s burying of her cremated
remains on Mount Tremper at a Buddhist temple in the Catskills and believed that
his choice was intentionally disrespectful. See Tom Precious, State Bill Would
Deny Killer Control of Victim Burial, THE BUFFALO NEWS, May 15, 2012,
available at 2012 WLNR 10272924. Conversely, Shepherd indicated to his
attorney that it would have been his dead wife’s wish because they were both
practicing Buddhists. Id.
7. See Michael Gormley, NY Seeks to Deny Murderers Spousal Burial
Rights, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2012), available at http://bigstory.ap.org
/content/ny-seeks-deny-murderers-spousal-burial-rights; Michael Regan, Loophole
Closed Allowing Control of Victim’s Body, TONAWANDA NEWS, Oct. 26, 2012,
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The public outcry over Constance Shepherd’s story and other
similar tragedies prompted the New York State Legislature to
amend its disposition of remains law in order to prevent murderers
from controlling the disposition of their victims’ remains.8 The law
prohibits any person who, “at the time of the decedent’s death, was
the subject of an order of protection protecting the decedent; or . . .
[who] has been arrested or charged with any crime . . . allegedly
causally related to the death of the decedent” from having “the right
to control the disposition of the remains of the decedent.”9 While
New York has closed its statutory gap that allowed “slayers”10 to
control the burial of their victims, many states have not yet remedied
this alarming oversight in the law.11 Consequently, in some states,
murderers like Stephen Shepherd continue to have the ability to
control the location, timing, and method of the disposition of their
victims’ remains.
Nearly all states have “slayer statutes” to ensure that slayers may
not inherit property or receive life insurance benefits as a result of
their criminal acts,12 but many states have not extended this
prohibition to the power of slayers to legally dispose of their
victims’ bodies.13 Although all states have enacted statutory
http://tonawanda-news.com/local/x674151912/Loophole-closed-allowing-controlof-victims-body.
8. See New York to Deny Burial Right of Convicted Murders, THE DAILY
NEWS, June 12, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 12776024. Another case
prompted action in New York: a murderer who beheaded his wife was able to
control the timing and location of her burial. Gormley, supra note 7. A week
before she was killed, the mother of three had filed for divorce. Id.
9. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (amended in 2012 to include a provision
calling for forfeiture when a person is arrested or charged with the decedent’s
death).
10. Throughout this Comment, the term “slayer” is used in a broader sense
than the word “murderer.” A person who commits murder is one who kills another
with malice aforethought. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (9th ed. 2009).
“Slayer” as used in this Comment refers to a person who commits an offense that
precludes the person from inheriting from his or her victim under the state’s slayer
statute. Slayer is generally defined as “a person who kills another, or who
participates in killing another, by an act that is felonious, intentional, and without
legal excuse or justification.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 45 (2011). However, the scope of offenses included in slayer
statutes varies by jurisdiction. See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 99 (Westlaw 2013). For
example, many statutes also encompass voluntary manslaughter, and some even
reach negligent homicide. See id.; see also infra note 180 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
12. The slayer rule “has been legislated in most U.S. jurisdictions and in the
few others it has been applied by common-law doctrines.” Nili Cohen, The Slayer
Rule, 92 B.U. L. REV. 793, 797 (2012).
13. See infra note 91.
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guidance concerning the order and priority of persons with the right
to control final disposition,14 nearly half lack forfeiture provisions15
to account for situations in which one of those individuals is
criminally responsible for the decedent’s death.16 Furthermore, even
state statutes that do have forfeiture provisions often do not provide
adequate coverage. First, some provisions do not encompass all
victim–offender relationships; several address only certain
categories of familial homicides, like spousal murders, while others
do not provide for forfeiture if the deceased specifically designated
the slayer to act as his or her agent for disposition.17 Second, many
provisions only contemplate forfeiture once criminal charges have
been brought, ignoring the timing considerations involved with
making disposition decisions as well as establishing probable cause
for an arrest.18 Third, statutes often do not provide an individual
who has forfeited the right of disposition the opportunity to
challenge the forfeiture in a timely manner.19
States must ensure that disposition rights are not granted to
slayers by virtue of poorly crafted disposition of remains statutes.20
Instead, these statutes should require forfeiture for any person
granted the right to control disposition, whether by designation or by
law, who is criminally responsible for the decedent’s death.
Forfeiture is essential to protect not only a decedent from being
victimized a second time by his or her slayer but also the victim’s
grieving survivors from being rendered powerless and unable to
control the final resting place of their loved one. As long as an
individual subject to forfeiture is given notice and an opportunity to
be heard when forfeiture takes place, the rights of all parties—the
accused, the surviving family members, and the victim—will be

14. See infra notes 91, 137.
15. A forfeiture provision is a clause in a statute “stating that, under certain
circumstances,” a person must lose “a right, privilege, or property.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 722 (defining “forfeiture” and “forfeiture clause”).
16. See infra note 91.
17. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
18. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
19. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
20. Throughout this Comment, the author refers to statutes governing the
disposition of remains as “disposition of remains statutes.” Such statutes have also
been referred to as “bodily remains statutes,” “sepulture statutes,” or “priority of
decision laws.” See, e.g., Tracie M. Kester, Note, Uniform Acts–Can the Dead
Hand Control the Dead Body? The Case for A Uniform Bodily Remains Law, 29
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 571 (2007) (using the phrases “bodily remains statutes” and
“sepulture statutes”); Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me Down in That Cold
Cold Ground: The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human Remains,
15 ELDER L.J. 381 (2007) (using the phrase “priority of decision laws”).
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taken into account, and the right of disposition will be in the proper
hands.
This Comment examines the current state of disposition of
remains laws in the United States, identifies the problematic
loopholes present in many statutes that permit slayers to control the
disposition of their victims’ bodies, and recommends the necessary
statutory amendments to keep disposition rights out of the hands of
slayers. Part I discusses the evolution of the American slayer rule, as
well as its inherent limitation—The victim’s body is not treated as
property forming part of the victim’s estate, and thus the slayer rule
does not cover the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s
body. The slayer’s ability to control the disposition is therefore
treated within state statutory regimes governing the disposition of
remains. Part II examines current statutory regimes in states without
forfeiture provisions and also highlights the deficiencies present in
regimes that do call for forfeiture. Part III provides guidance for
state legislatures seeking to revise their disposition of remains laws
to prevent slayers from potentially having the legal authority to
control their victims’ dispositions. In doing so, Part III makes
recommendations for determining the proper scope of forfeiture
provisions and for safeguarding due process rights. Finally, the
Appendix contains a model disposition of remains statute
encompassing the statutory provisions necessary to keep disposition
rights out of the hands of slayers.
I. FAMILY HOMICIDES AND THE SLAYER RULE
Domestic violence experts have noted that “‘[w]ith the
exception of the police and the military, the family is perhaps the
most violent social group, and the home the most violent social
setting, in our society.’”21 In the United States, 22% of homicide
victims are killed by a spouse or another family member.22 Between
1980 and 2008, the offender in 10% of homicides was a spouse, and
12% of offenders were other family members of the victim.23 This
latter statistic includes parricide (the murder of a parent by a child),
21. Robin L. Preble, Family Violence and Family Property: A Proposal for
Reform, 13 LAW & INEQ. 401, 403 (1995) (quoting RICHARD J. GELLES &
MURRAY A. STRAUS, CRIME AND THE FAMILY 88 (A.J. Lincoln & M.A. Straus
eds., 1985)).
22. ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008 16
(2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus8008.pdf. This
statistic only includes homicides for which the victim–offender relationship was
known. Id.
23. Id.
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filicide (the killing of a child by a parent), and siblicide (the murder
of a sibling).24
Although there is now heightened awareness and concern
surrounding family violence,25 domestic violence has largely been
ignored due to society’s traditional belief that it was a “private
matter” that was “best resolved behind closed doors.”26 While
criminal law has evolved to address family violence,27 the legal
response to familial homicides has been complicated by this
traditional societal view.28 Consequently, there is still much progress
to be made.29
A. The Slayer Rule and Slayer Statutes
The problem of familial murders is not new.30 Although the law
cannot mend the harm caused by such killings, courts and
legislatures have supplemented criminal law punishments with the
common law slayer rule, “[t]he doctrine that neither a person who
kills another nor the killer’s heirs can share in the decedent’s

24. Although these categories of family homicide are the most common, this
statistic also includes homicides committed by other family members. Id. at 21.
For a discussion of the different types of family homicides, see Chelsea Diem &
Jesenia M. Pizarro, Social Structure and Family Homicides, 25 J. FAM. VIOLENCE
521 (2010).
25. See Proclamation No. 887777, 77 Fed. Reg. 60,611 (Oct. 1, 2012).
26. Laurie S. Kohn, The Justice System and Domestic Violence: Engaging the
Case but Divorcing the Victim, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 191, 196 (2008).
See also Bernadette Dunn Sewell, History of Abuse: Societal, Judicial, and
Legislative Responses to the Problem of Wife Beating, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 983,
992 (1989) (“Courts were initially slow to heed the change in public opinion . . . .
They emphasized the importance of family autonomy and privacy by displaying a
hesitancy to invade the domestic forum.”).
27. See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and
the Legal Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1263 (2009)
(discussing the recent trend towards the criminalization of domestic violence).
28. ADRIA GALLUP-BLACK, RURAL AND URBAN TRENDS IN FAMILY AND
INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE: 1980–1999 1 (2004), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/208344.pdf.
29. Although the country has made some progress with respect to changing
laws and attitudes toward domestic violence, three women a day in the United
States still lose their lives as a result of domestic violence. See Proclamation No.
887777, supra note 25.
30. “One of the earliest recorded episodes implicating [this] problem . . .
appears to be the Biblical story of Cain and Abel. Spurred by jealousy, ‘Cain rose
up against Abel his brother, and slew him.’” Karen J. Sneddon, Should Cain’s
Children Inherit Abel’s Property?: Wading into the Extended Slayer Rule
Quagmire, 76 UMKC L. REV. 101, 101 (2007) (quoting Genesis 4:8 (King
James)).
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estate.”31 The slayer rule embodies the maxim that one cannot
benefit from one’s own crime.32 Nearly all United States
jurisdictions have codified the slayer rule into “slayer statutes,”
which “prohibit[] a person’s killer from taking any part of the
decedent’s estate through will or intestacy.”33 Grounded in “moral,
equitable, and legal principles,”34 a version of the slayer rule appears
in nearly every legal system.35
1. The Evolution of the American Slayer Rule
At early English common law, the doctrines of attainder,
forfeiture of lands and chattels, corruption of blood, and escheat
obviated the need for a slayer rule, as neither a slayer nor the
slayer’s heirs had the opportunity to benefit from the criminal
wrongdoing.36 However, in 1814 Parliament began enacting a series
31. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1515.
32. Christopher M. Eisold, Statute in the Abyss: The Implications of Insanity
on Wisconsin’s Slayer Statute, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 875 (2008).
33. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1515. See supra note 12
and accompanying text.
34. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102.
35. Cohen, supra note 12, at 794. Civil law countries also refuse to permit
slayers to inherit property from their victims under the doctrine of unworthy heirs.
“Unworthiness is derived from two Roman institutions: (1) Exheredatio, the
power of the father to exclude his children from the succession; . . . . [and] (2)
Eremptorium, the exclusion of certain heirs for unworthiness, in case of the
decedent’s silence.” 3 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL
517–18 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959) (11th ed. 1938). An unworthy person is
deprived of his succession because he has “failed in some duty towards the
deceased” and, therefore, does “not deserve to inherit from him.” KATHRYN
VENTURATOS LORIO, SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS § 5:3, in 10 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 141 (2d ed. 2009).
36. Julie J. Olenn, ‘Til Death Do Us Part: New York’s Slayer Rule and In Re
Estates of Covert, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1341, 1343 (2001). Under the doctrine of
attainder, a person’s civil rights were extinguished if the person was convicted of a
capital offense. Alison Reppy, The Slayer’s Bounty—History of Problem in AngloAmerican Law, 19 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 229, 232–33 (1942). As incidents of
attainder, the land and property of the criminal were then forfeited to the King as
punishment, which would have included any property the criminal inherited from
the victim. Id. The doctrine of corruption of blood barred the murderer’s heirs
“unto the remotest generation” from inheriting, as the “blood of the attainted
person was said to be corrupt.” Id. at 233. Furthermore, under the law of feudal
escheat, which “was superadded to the earlier law of forfeiture,” the felon’s land
was said to escheat to the lord because he or she left no lawful successor—the
felon’s bloodline was corrupted, so its inheritable quality was extinguished and
“blotted out forever.” Id. at 233–34. Because the crown was very frequently also
the superior lord, the two doctrines of forfeiture and escheat have often been
confused. 11 THE AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF LAW 316 (David
S. Garland et al. eds., 2d ed. 1899) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPÆDIA]. However,
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of statutes to eliminate these archaic doctrines.37 Fifty-six years later
it passed the Forfeiture Act of 1870, which “abolished the entire
doctrine of attainder, forfeiture and corruption of blood, or
escheat.”38 It was not until after this Act was passed that the courts
of England were faced with the situation of slayers potentially
taking their victims’ property.39 To address the problem, the courts
promulgated the “rule of public policy,” which prohibited slayers
from benefiting from their own wrongdoing.40
Because Parliament did not pass the Forfeiture Act until after the
American Revolution took place, the law in colonial America
initially encompassed the early common law doctrines.41 Their
existence, however, was relatively short-lived; constitutional and
statutory enactments soon expressly abrogated them.42 As a result,
slayers attempted to reap benefits from their crimes, claiming that
otherwise they were “being denied what was ‘rightfully’ theirs.”43 In
response, American courts also relied on the rule of public policy

forfeiture of the offender’s land and possessions to the King as criminal
punishment was the doctrine of the old Anglo-Saxon law—it had nothing to do
with the feudal system. Id. at 316–17. Feudal escheat did not come about in
England until the time of the Norman Conquest. Id. at 317. Feudal escheat was at
first subordinate to the law of forfeiture but later prevalent during the English
feudal period. Reppy, supra, at 233–34. Under feudal escheat, a tenant’s
conviction was considered a breach of the lease of the land, so the feud reverted
back to the superior lord. ENCYCLOPÆDIA, supra, at 316. If the King acquired an
estate as the superior lord, it was not as a sovereign but rather as a proprietor. Id.
Further, forfeiture applied to both land and possessions, while escheat applied only
to land. Id.
37. Reppy, supra note 36, at 234.
38. Id. at 238. However, there was an exception for forfeiture consequent
upon outlawry. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 242. See also infra Part I.A.2.
41. Reppy, supra note 36, at 244.
42. See id.
[I]n 1789, the Federal Constitution led the way in providing: “The
Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except
during the life of the person attainted.” Similar provision [sic] have been
incorporated into some of our state constitutions. Generally, however, in
other states the matter has been covered by statutory enactments
providing that conviction of a felony shall not work a forfeiture or
corruption of blood.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2).
43. Sara M. Gregory, Paved with Good ‘Intentions’: The Latent Ambiguities
in New Jersey’s Slayer Statute, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 824 (2010).
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and the fundamental maxims of the common law to keep disposition
rights out of the hands of slayers.44
2. The Rule of Public Policy
Unlike the penal nature of criminal law or the compensatory
function of tort law, the slayer rule, the name frequently used to
refer to the rule of public policy, instead propagates the maxim that
no man shall benefit or profit from his wrong.45 The underlying
moral principle is that human life is sacred.46 Additionally, “[t]he
law of unjust enrichment forecloses the possibility that a person
might benefit from committing a felonious and intentional
homicide.”47 Further, an individual should not be legally permitted
to control the transfer of another’s property by bringing about that
person’s death.48 These principles also seek to preserve the victim’s
intent—presumably that he or she would not want the slayer to
benefit by virtue of the killing.49
In the early 20th century, states began adopting “slayer statutes”
in order to prevent slayers from receiving property as a result of
killing their victims.50 Now, nearly all states have slayer statutes
44. See, e.g., Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (“It
would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover
insurance money payable on the death of the party whose life he had feloniously
taken.”); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (“To answer these
questions in the affirmative it seems to me would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of our state, and an offense against public policy.”); Weaver v.
Hollis, 22 So. 2d 525, 527 (Ala. 1945) (“A reasonable interpretation of [the
statute], in the light of the common-law principle that no person can take
advantage of his own wrong; that the law permits no one to profit by his own
crime, precludes a felonious killer from taking from his murdered spouse.”).
45. See Bradley Myers, The New North Dakota Slayer Statute: Does It Cause
A Criminal Forfeiture?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 997, 1002 (2007); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4 cmt. a (2003).
One court elaborated:
The rule is believed to have its antecedents in ancient maxims of general
jurisprudence: No man shall take advantage of his own wrong and its
Law-French and Latin counterparts—(1) Nul prenda advantage de son
tort demesne; (2) Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propia;
(3) Jus ex injuria non oritur; (4) Nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est
audiendus; and (5) Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem.
State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027, 1035 n.6
(Okla. 1985) (Opala, J., concurring) (alteration to original).
46. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 45
cmt. a (2011).
48. Sneddon, supra note 30, at 102–03.
49. Id. at 103.
50. Myers, supra note 45, at 1002.
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codifying the principles underlying the rule of public policy.51 While
the statutes differ from state to state, they generally address the same
issues: who qualifies as a slayer, what property is forfeited, and who
then receives the property.52 There is no question as to the
recognition and legitimacy of the slayer rule; however, uncertainties
remain as to its scope.53
B. The Slayer Rule’s Inherent Limitation
Despite judicial recognition that “the burial of the dead is a
subject which interests the feelings of mankind to a much greater
degree than many matters of actual property,”54 the slayer rule does
not extend to the right to control the disposition of a person’s
remains. The slayer rule applies to a decedent’s estate, which is
composed of “[t]he real and personal property that a person
possesses at the time of death and that passes to the heirs or
testamentary beneficiaries.”55 Additionally, most states apply their
slayer statutes to life insurance proceeds.56 But because there is no
property right in a body, it does not form part of the decedent’s
estate.57
51. “The rule is currently found in forty-eight states and also in the Uniform
Probate Code § 2-803 (2006).” Cohen, supra note 12, at 797 n.32. The remaining
two states address the situation through case law. Anne-Marie Rhodes,
Consequences of Heirs’ Misconduct: Moving from Rules to Discretion, 33 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 975, 979 n.21 (2007) (“Neither Massachusetts nor New Hampshire
has a statute, but each has case law precedent to prevent a killer from inheriting.
Maryland takes an interesting bifurcated approach, relying on case law for the
slayer, but essentially barring the slayer’s issue [every living lineal descendant]
from inheriting by statute.” (citations omitted)). Louisiana’s slayer statute reflects
its civil law tradition, using the doctrine of unworthiness to prevent slayers from
inheriting. The Louisiana Civil Code provides: “A successor shall be declared
unworthy if he is convicted of a crime involving the intentional killing, or
attempted killing, of the decedent or is judicially determined to have participated
in the intentional, unjustified killing, or attempted killing, of the decedent.” LA.
CIV. CODE art. 941 (2013). As an effect of being declared unworthy, “[t]he
successor is deprived of his right to the succession to which he had been called.”
LA. CIV. CODE art. 945 (2013).
52. Myers, supra note 45, at 1004.
53. Cohen, supra note 12, at 794. “The still vivid discussion . . . revolves
around several partially overlapping tensions: law and morality; text and context;
rules and standards; public and private; civil and criminal liability; courts and
legislators.” Id.
54. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 237–38
(1872).
55. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 629.
56. Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely A Matter of Equity, 71
IOWA L. REV. 489, 506 (1986).
57. 22A AM. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 3 (Westlaw 2013).
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Early English common law adopted the position that there was
no right of property—and thus no ownership right—in dead
bodies.58 The English courts developed this rule in response to
citizens’ attempts to direct the disposition of their remains by
testament.59 As Sir Edward Coke famously stated, the burial of
corpses was “nullius in bonis”60—belonging to no one;61 thus,
disposition could not be declared by will.62 Legal scholars believe
that this rule was promulgated as a result of the jurisdictional divide
between the secular courts and ecclesiastical courts in England.63
Because people were traditionally buried in church cemeteries,64 the
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the dead and the burial
process instead of the secular courts.65 The dead were considered
objects sacred to God rather than objects of property.66
American courts initially adopted the English common law rule
that there are no property rights in the dead.67 Thus, the body is not
treated as property that forms part of the estate,68 and consequently
slayer statutes do not revoke the right to dispose of a decedent’s
remains. Because there is no true property right in a dead body,69 the
theory of “quasi-property” emerged as a way for courts to mitigate
the harsh consequences of the common law rule.70
58. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Quasi-Property: Like, But Not Quite
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1889, 1895 (2012); Tanya K. Hernández, The
Property of Death, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 971, 982 (1999).
59. Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV.
207, 225 (1986).
60. SIR EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND
CRIMINAL CAUSES 203 (W. Clarke & Sons, 1809). See also Balganesh, supra note
58, at 1896.
61. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1173.
62. Hardiman, supra note 59, at 225.
63. Id. at 226.
64. Kester, supra note 20, at 573–74.
65. Hardiman, supra note 59, at 226. In modern English law, legal courts of
general jurisdiction govern the burial process. Id.
66. Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV.
195, 228 (1996).
67. Id.
68. W. C. Rodgers, Property Rights in Human Bodies, 73 CENT. L.J. 39, 39
(1911) (“But the body does not descend by inheritance. The heir inherits the
property of his ancestor, dying intestate, yet he will not come into the possession
or ownership of his dead body through the law of descent.”).
69. 25A C.J.S. Dead Bodies § 2 (Westlaw 2013).
70. Ducor, supra note 66, at 228–29. Over time, English courts also began to
recognize a quasi-property right of the next of kin in the decedent’s body. Kester,
supra note 20, at 574.
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II. AN EXAMINATION OF DISPOSITION OF REMAINS STATUTES
Nearly all states have enacted special legislation to create legal
recognition of the quasi-property right of next of kin and other
individuals in a decedent’s remains for disposition purposes.71
However, these disposition of remains statutes vary widely,
especially with respect to the inclusion and scope of forfeiture
provisions.
A. Rights in Remains
The majority of U.S. courts faced with the issue of whether there
is a property interest in a decedent’s remains agree that some kind of
right does exist and often label it as a “quasi-property right.”72 As
quasi-property, no one owns the decedent’s body, but instead there
is a custodial interest over the deceased person’s remains for
purposes of disposition.73 In England, the right and duty to dispose
of remains belongs to the executor.74 However, this is not the case in
the United States. Because the body is not considered property
included as part of the probate estate,75 it is not subject to
administration by the executor.76 Instead, the right vests in the
decedent’s next of kin—“[t]he person or persons most closely
related to a decedent by blood or affinity.”77

71. See infra notes 91, 137.
72. See, e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 1991)
(citing In re Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 (Utah 1978); Arnaud v.
Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989); Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th
Cir. 1984)). However, some courts have abandoned the quasi-property theory in
favor of a mental anguish or infliction of emotional distress tort remedy,
suggesting that the quasi-property right in a body is a legal fiction that does not
protect a true ownership interest. Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human
Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 385 (2000).
73. Balganesh, supra note 58, at 1897.
74. Russell E. Haddleton, What to Do with the Body? The Trouble with
Postmortem Disposition, 20 PROB. & PROP. 55, 56 (2006).
75. The probate estate is “[a] decedent’s property subject to administration by
a personal representative. The probate estate comprises property owned by the
decedent at the time of death and property acquired by the decedent’s estate at or
after the time of death.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1322.
76. Haddleton, supra note 74, at 56.
77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1142. Although the specific
rights granted by statute vary by state, “toward the end of the 19th century, . . .
courts began to recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and
control the disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the violation of which
was actionable at law.” Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791–92 (9th
Cir. 2002).
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This right generally includes not only the right to determine the
timing, place, and manner of disposition78 but also “the right to have
[the body] remain in its final resting place, the right to remove the
body to a proper place, and the right to maintain an action to recover
damages for any outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the
deceased.”79 Although some courts differ on the exact classification
of the interest,80 every state has codified the principle that a
decedent’s next of kin have an exclusive right to possess the
decedent’s remains for the purpose of disposition.81 Right of
disposition statutes provide a list of persons, generally in order of
priority, who have the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s
remains.82 The traditional rule in most jurisdictions is that the right
of disposition vests first in the surviving spouse.83 This order of
priority stems from the early belief that “[t]he bond of matrimony is
the closest of all human ties.”84 Accordingly, courts have held that
“[i]n the guardianship of the remains of a deceased person the
marital right prevails over that of the next of kin.”85 If no surviving
spouse exists, generally the right then vests in the adult children of

78. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New Property Regime in
Human Bodies and Body Parts, 24 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 19, 31
(2002). “The history of how human remains have been treated, mistreated, stolen,
sold, and used in underground trade” brought about “statutory approaches to
disposing human remains, as well as the law governing coroners, and the
constitutional interpretation of property.” Denay L. Wilding Knope, Over My
Dead Body: How the Albrecht Decisions Complicate the Constitutional Dilemma
of Due Process & the Dead, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 169, 173 (2009) (footnotes
omitted).
79. 8 AM. JUR. PL. & PR. FORMS Dead Bodies § 1 (Westlaw 2013). But see
infra note 206 and accompanying text.
80. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480–81 (6th Cir. 1991).
81. See infra notes 91, 137. However, some states allow decedents to leave
disposition instructions or appoint an agent for disposition. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
82. Eloisa C. Rodriguez-Dod, Ashes to Ashes: Comparative Law Regarding
Survivors’ Disputes Concerning Cremation and Cremated Remains, 17
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 316 (2008).
83. Murphy, supra note 20, at 401. Virginia, however, has a unique statute in
that it places the spouse and next of kin on equal footing. See VA. CODE ANN. §
54.1-2807 (Westlaw 2013) (“The authority and directions of any next of kin shall
govern the disposal of the body, subject to the provisions of § 54.1-2807.01 or
54.1-2825.” (emphasis added)); see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.e.
84. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 231 (1872).
See also Leschey v. Leschey, 97 A.2d 784, 787 (Pa. 1953) (“The reason for the
preference given to the surviving spouse in the matter of interment or reinterment
unquestionably is founded upon the relationship between husband and wife as the
closest family tie.”).
85. Pierce, 10 R.I. at 231.
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the decedent, followed by the surviving parents, adult siblings, and
finally, remaining next of kin.86
B. The Current State of Disposition of Remains Statutes
Recently, states have begun amending their statutes to depart
from the traditional disposition of remains regime. For example,
several states now classify the right of domestic partners or civil
union partners on the same level as spouses.87 Many states also
allow a person to leave instructions or designate an agent to control
the disposition of his or her remains, whether or not this person is a
family member.88 Furthermore, several statutes now include
forfeiture provisions when there is a pending divorce, legal
separation, estrangement, or if a protective order has been issued
against the person vested with the right of disposition.89 Importantly,
some states have amended their disposition of remains statutes to
provide for forfeiture if the person vested with the right of
disposition is criminally responsible for the decedent’s death,90
although many still have not.

86. See, e.g., 239 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.09 (Westlaw 2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.81 (Westlaw 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-904 (Westlaw 2013).
87. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-509 (Westlaw 2013); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-33.2-24 (Westlaw 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5227
(Westlaw 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw 2013). For a
detailed discussion of the outdated family paradigm and its application to the
disposition of remains, see Frances H. Foster, Individualized Justice in Disputes
Over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008).
88. Hernández, supra note 58, at 1026–27. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 541142 (Westlaw 2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1158 (Westlaw 2013); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (West 2010).
89. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right of
disposition in surviving spouse unless petition to dissolve marriage was pending at
the time of death or if a judge determines the deceased and the spouse were
estranged); IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right in
surviving spouse except when a petition to dissolve marriage or for legal
separation is pending or if the court determines the decedent and spouse were
physically and emotionally separated at the time of death); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013) (vesting right in surviving spouse or surviving civil
union or domestic partner unless the decedent had a temporary or permanent
restraining order issued against him or her); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201
(McKinney 2013) (vesting right in surviving spouse unless the person was subject
to an order of protection at the time of the decedent’s death).
90. See infra note 137.
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1. States Without Forfeiture Provisions
Nearly half of states do not have provisions within their
disposition of remains statutes calling for forfeiture when an
individual granted the right of disposition is, in fact, the person who
killed the victim.91 Although some may grant a decedent’s next of
kin standing to bring a dispute in court,92 most states without
forfeiture provisions do not provide any avenue for the family to
91. The following jurisdictions do not currently have forfeiture provisions:
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-318 (West, Westlaw through 2013
Jan. Reg. Sess.) (proposed amendment in 2013); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, §§ 264, 268–269 (West 2006); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE §§ 3-413 to 3413.01 (Westlaw 2013); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1734 (Westlaw 2013);
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 213.420, 367.97501, 367.97527 (Westlaw
2013); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:655 (2005), id. § 37:876 (2007);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-509, 5-511 (Westlaw 2013), MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 7-410 (Westlaw 2013); Massachusetts, 239 MASS.
CODE REGS. 3.09 (Westlaw 2013), MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 38, § 13 (West,
Westlaw through ch. 83 of 2013 1st Ann. Sess.) (proposed amendment in 2013);
Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.3206, 700.3208 (Westlaw 2013);
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.80 (Westlaw 2013); Mississippi, MISS.
CODE. ANN. § 73-11-58 (West 2010); Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 194.119
(Westlaw 2013); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-1425 (Westlaw 2013)
(proposed amendment in 2013); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 451.023–
451.024 (Westlaw 2013); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-12A-1 to 24-12A2, 61-32-19 (Westlaw 2013); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 90210.124, 130A-420 (Westlaw 2013); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§
23-06-03, 26-06-31 (Westlaw 2013); Pennsylvania, 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
305 (Westlaw 2013); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 5-33.2-24, 5-33.3-3
(Westlaw 2013); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-5-570, 32-8-315, 32-8320, 40-19-280 (Westlaw 2013); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-26-1,
34-26-16 to 34-26-17, 34-26A-2 (Westlaw 2013); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§
54.1-2800, 54.1-2807 to 54.1-2807.01, 54.1-2825, 54.1-2973 (Westlaw 2013);
Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-17-101 (Westlaw 2013).
92. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.420 (“In the event that a homicide has
been committed and the person charged . . . refuses to permit the burial of the . . .
victim of his or her alleged homicide, any member of the family of the deceased . . .
may apply to [the court] for an order to release the body of the deceased [for
disposition].”); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-511 (“An individual may file a
petition with the appropriate court to obtain the authority to be authorizing agent” if
he alleges that permitting the person to have authority “may cause substantial
injustice” or if the individual “had a closer personal affinity to the decedent and
should be allowed to make the arrangements.”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 305
(allowing the filing of “a petition alleging enduring estrangement, incompetence,
contrary intent or waiver and agreement”); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2807.01 (“In
the absence of a designation . . . when there is a disagreement among a decedent’s
next of kin concerning the arrangements for his funeral or the disposition of his
remains, any of the next of kin may petition the circuit court where the decedent
resided at the time of his death to determine which of the next of kin shall have the
authority to make arrangements for the decedent’s funeral or the disposition of his
remains.”).
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challenge the slayer’s authority and control over the victim’s body.
An in-depth analysis of the disposition of remains statutes in a few
of the states lacking explicit forfeiture provisions reveals how some
states leave open the possibility of slayers retaining the right to
control the disposition of their victims’ remains.93
a. Louisiana
Over the past 15 years, Louisiana has consistently suffered from
a high rate of homicides involving one female victim and one male
offender.94 Despite its high domestic homicide rate,95 Louisiana
does not have a forfeiture provision within its disposition of remains
statute. Unlike Louisiana’s slayer statute, which follows the civil
law doctrine of “unworthiness,”96 Louisiana’s disposition of remains
statute recognizes the quasi-property right of possession applied by
most common law states.97 The statute allows for a person to leave
specific directions in the form of a written and notarized
93. The five states whose statutory regimes are analyzed in this Comment
were ranked by the Violence Policy Center (VPC) in the top ten states for highest
female-victim and male-offender homicide rates in 2010. This statistic is often
used to analyze domestic homicide rates. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN
MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6–7 (2012), available at
http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf. As of the writing of this Comment, no
published decisions have addressed the ambiguities present in state laws relating to
the disposition of remains and forfeiture. However, this should not be any indication
of the relevance or importance of forfeiture provisions and well-written disposition
of remains statutes. Court orders determining who has the right of disposition are
unlikely to be reported. Further, appeals are impractical in many cases given the
timing of disposition decisions.
94. The female-victim and male-offender homicide rate statistic is often used
to analyze domestic homicide rates. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN
MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 6–7 (2012), available
at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf. Louisiana has ranked in the top
five of the VPC’s annual report 14 out of the past 15 years. See When Men Murder
Women, VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, http://www.vpc.org/wmmw.htm (last visited
Jan. 13, 2013).
95. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text; see also Nevada Ranks #1
in Rate of Women Murdered by Men for Third Year in a Row According to VPC
Study Released Annually for Domestic Violence Awareness Month in October,
VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.vpc.org/press/1209wmmw
.htm (stating that VPC’s study is “released each year to coincide with Domestic
Violence Awareness Month”).
96. See supra notes 35, 51 and accompanying text.
97. See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (“After
considering the relevant Louisiana statutory and case law regarding the rights of
next of kin in the body of a deceased relative, we conclude that Louisiana has
indeed established a ‘quasi-property’ right of survivors in the remains of their
deceased relatives.”).
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declaration.98 Unless this is done, the right to control interment99 or
cremation100 vests first in the surviving spouse, so long as no
petition for divorce is pending.101 If no surviving spouse exists or a
petition for divorce is filed, the right devolves to the surviving adult
children and continues down the list of next of kin.102 As currently
written, Louisiana’s statute leaves open the possibility that the
person granted the right of disposition is the slayer who took the
decedent’s life.
b. Nevada
Nevada has likewise led the nation in the rate of female-victim
and male-offender homicides, ranking first for the past three years.103
Despite holding this rank for five of the past six years104 and having a
rate more than twice the national average,105 Nevada has yet to
include a forfeiture provision within its disposition of remains statute.
In Nevada, a person may authorize another to make his or her burial
arrangements through a legally valid document or in an affidavit.106 If
no such person has been designated, that right then vests in the
surviving spouse and continues down the order of next of kin.107
However, the statute does not take away the right of disposition if the
designated agent, surviving spouse, or next of kin is criminally
responsible for the person’s death.108

98. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8:655 (2005).
99. “‘Interment’ means the disposition of human remains by inurnment,
scattering, entombment, or burial in a place used or intended to be used, and
dedicated, for cemetery purposes.” Id. § 8:1.
100. Louisiana has a separate statute governing cremation. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:876 (2007).
101. § 8:655; § 37:876.
102. § 37:876.
103. Nevada Ranks #1 in Rate of Women Murdered by Men for Third Year in a
Row According to VPC Study Released Annually for Domestic Violence
Awareness Month in October, VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER (Sept. 19, 2012), http:
//www.vpc.org/press/1209wmmw.htm.
104. Id.
105. The national rate in 2010 was 1.22 per 100,000. In Nevada, this rate was
2.62 per 100,000. VIOLENCE POL’Y CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2010 HOMICIDE DATA 5–6 (2012), available at http://www.vpc
.org/studies/wmmw2012.pdf.
106. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.024 (Westlaw 2013).
107. Id.
108. If the decedent was a member of the armed forces, either active duty or
reserve, at the time of death, a person designated on the emergency data form as
the person authorized to direct disposition would have priority before the spouse.
Id.
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c. New Mexico
New Mexico’s statutes relating to the disposition of remains are
located under its Cremation and Thanatopractice109 regulations.
There are two sections under the Cremation regulations, one labeled
“No written instructions; priority of others to decide disposition”110
and the other labeled “Right to authorize cremation; definitions.”111
To make matters more confusing, there is a section in the
Thanatopractice regulations entitled “Cremation; requirements; right
to authorize cremation; disposition of cremains,” which combines
the language of both sections.112
Both sections 24-12A-2 and 61-32-19 describe the priority of
persons who can decide disposition if no written instructions are left
by the decedent. The first person listed in both statutes is the
surviving spouse, followed by the next of kin.113 While these
statutes seemingly relate only to cremation (one located among
cremation regulations and the other entitled “Cremation”), the
statutory language indicates that the right of disposition is not
limited to cremation but extends to other means of disposition as
well.114
In addition, sections 24-12A-1 and 61-32-19 contain provisions
stating that one “may authorize [one’s] own cremation and the
lawful disposition of [one’s] cremains by: (1) stating [one’s] desire
to be cremated in a written statement that is signed by the
[declarant] and notarized or witnessed by two other persons; or (2)
including an express statement in [one’s] will.”115 But it is unclear
from these sections whether this same form requirement would be
necessary if the desired means of disposition is not cremation.
Furthermore, the second method of authorization, an express
statement in a will, may not be effective.116 Often a will is not
located until after disposition arrangements have taken place,117 or
“survivors [may] not consult the contents of a will until after the
decedent has been buried, thereby obviating any formal
109. Thanatopractice relates to the “handling and care of the dead and the
sensitivities of those who survive.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-32-2 (West 2013).
110. Id. § 24-12A-2.
111. Id. § 24-12A-1.
112. Id. § 61-32-19.
113. § 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19.
114. “[T]he following persons in the order listed shall determine the means of
disposition, not to be limited to cremation, of the remains of the decedent . . . .”
§ 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19 (emphasis added).
115. § 24-12A-1, § 61-32-19.
116. See Kester, supra note 20, at 585; Hernández, supra note 58, at 1020.
117. Kester, supra note 20, at 585.
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consideration of the decedent’s . . . wishes stated in the will.”118
However, it is clear from the sections that when no instructions are
left, the default order of priority will be used, regardless of whether
the right holder is responsible for the decedent’s death.119
d. South Carolina
Not only do the disposition of remains statutes in South Carolina
lack forfeiture provisions, but they are also poorly constructed and
unclear. First, laws governing disposition rights in South Carolina
are not contained within a single statute. Under the regulations for
embalmers and funeral directors, one statute provides that a public
officer or “any other person having a professional relationship with
the decedent” may not send remains to a funeral establishment
“without having first made due inquiry as to the desires of the next
of kin . . . . If any kin is found, authority and directions of the kin
govern except in those instances where the deceased made prior
arrangements in writing.”120 However, there is neither a definition of
next of kin nor an order of priority as to who would make such
decisions. Under the statutes governing the duties of coroners and
medical examiners, one section provides that “[a]fter the postmortem examination, autopsy, or inquest has been completed, the
dead body must be released to the person lawfully entitled to it for
burial,” indicating that there is one person in control—but the
statutes lack a description of who has the ultimate authority.121
Although South Carolina does not have a statute providing a
clear order and priority of persons with the right of disposition,
South Carolina courts have followed the common law rule that the
right vests first in the surviving spouse, then in the next of kin.122
Additionally, South Carolina recently amended its cremation
authorization statute to provide that in the absence of a preneed
cremation authorization in which a decedent specifies the final
disposition of his or her cremated remains, there is an order of
priority of persons who may authorize cremation.123 The right first
devolves upon a “person designated as agent for this purpose by the
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Hernández, supra note 58, at 1020.
§ 24-12A-2; § 61-32-19 (“not to be limited to cremation”).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-19-280 (Westlaw 2013).
Id. § 17-5-570.
C. CRAIG YOUNG ET AL., DEAD BODIES § 9, in 6 SOUTH CAROLINA
JURISPRUDENCE (Westlaw 2013) (citing Simpkins v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,
20 S.E.2d 733 (1942) (“determining that a surviving spouse has primary right to
possession of a dead body and to control disposition thereof, unless the decedent
has by will or other expression made a different disposition”)).
123. S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-8-320b (Westlaw 2013).
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decedent in a will or other verified and attested document” and if
none exists, then upon “the spouse of the decedent.”124 The statute
continues to list the next of kin in order of priority: adult children,
surviving parents, adult siblings, adult grandchildren, grandparents,
and so on.125 While the South Carolina statutes are far from clear,
the same order of priority as listed in the cremation authorization
statute would likely also be used to establish the person in charge of
determining the general method of disposition, whether or not that
person killed the decedent.
e. Virginia
Virginia’s disposition of remains statutes are simultaneously
complicated and unique. In the chapter of the Virginia Code entitled
“Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers,” “next of kin” is
defined as “any of the following persons, regardless of the
relationship to the decedent: [any designated agent], the legal
spouse, child over 18 years of age, custodial parent, noncustodial
parent, siblings . . . or any other relative in the descending order of
blood relationship.”126 A separate statute then provides that “[t]he
authority and directions of any next of kin shall govern the disposal
of the [decedent’s] body, subject to the provisions of [the section
governing disagreements of next of kin] or [the section governing
the designation of an individual to make final arrangements].”127
It is important to note the statutes’ uses of the word “any”—
Virginia is the only state to statutorily define the relatives who
qualify as next of kin and grant them authority to control the
disposition of remains but not provide any order of priority among
the relatives.128 Although a designated agent has the ultimate
authority over any next of kin, no priority exists among the
decedent’s spouse and relatives with respect to the right to control
disposition.129 The General Assembly of Virginia elected not to use
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2800 (Westlaw 2013) (emphasis added).
127. Id. § 54.1-2807 (emphasis added) (referencing id. §§ 54.1-2807.01, 54.12825).
128. However, there is an order and priority of persons who may authorize
postmortem examination of a decedent’s body. Id. § 54.1-2973.
129. Id. § 54.1-2825 (“Any person may designate in a signed and notarized
writing, which has been accepted in writing by the person so designated, an
individual who shall make arrangements and be otherwise responsible for his
funeral and the disposition of his remains . . . upon his death. Such designee shall
have priority over all persons otherwise entitled to make such arrangements,
provided that a copy of the signed and notarized writing is provided to the funeral
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“a sequential hierarchy of relatives” but rather to keep the rights of
the next of kin “broad and coequal.”130 One purpose of having a
broad class of individuals is so that a body can be disposed of in an
expeditious manner “without resort to the difficult and often
confusing task of sequentially determining who within a blood line
is entitled to claim the body that requires immediate attention.”131
However, Virginia acknowledges that disagreements may arise
among the next of kin since the rights of the relatives are coequal;
section 54.1-2807.01 states that in the absence of a designation, any
relative may petition the court to “determine which of the next of
kin shall have the authority to make arrangements for the decedent’s
funeral or the disposition of his remains.”132 The court must
consider a list of factors in determining who should be authorized to
make the decisions, including “the expressed wishes, if any, of the
decedent, the legal and factual relationship between or among the
disputing next of kin and between each of the disputing next of kin
and the decedent, and any other factor the court considers
relevant.”133
Though the statute does allow the next of kin to petition the
court when disposition disputes arise, a slayer would still technically
have a coequal right of disposition because forfeiture is not
automatic. Furthermore, the language in the statute relating to
disputes leaves open the possibility that a designated person could
kill the victim and still have ultimate control over his or her
disposition, without the family’s ability to challenge.134 This is
because a designated agent has priority over all next of kin,135 and
the statute relating to disputes only allows family members to
petition the court “[i]n the absence of a designation.”136
2. States with Forfeiture Provisions
Although many state statutes currently do not provide for
forfeiture, there has been legislative progress toward divesting
slayers of disposition rights; presently, 28 states have some version

service establishment and to the cemetery, if any, no later than 48 hours after the
funeral service establishment has received the remains.” (emphasis added)).
130. Siver v. Rockingham Mem’l Hosp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (W.D.
Va. 1999).
131. Id. at 611.
132. § 54.1-2807.01.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. § 54.1-2825.
136. § 54.1-2807.01.
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of a forfeiture provision within their disposition of remains
statutes.137 However, even among these statutes, there is wide
variation. Some provisions only address situations in which the
spouse is the killer, thereby not encompassing cases where another
family member may be responsible for the death yet retains the right
to control the disposition of the victim’s remains.138 Other
provisions do not account for cases when the slayer may be
designated as an agent for disposition.139 Additionally, most
provisions only contemplate forfeiture when criminal charges have
been brought against the slayer, not reaching instances when law
enforcement cannot establish probable cause or make an arrest
before disposition decisions are made.140 Lastly, most statutes do not
allow a person whose right has been forfeited the ability to challenge
the presumption that the forfeiture is just.141

137. The following states have some form of a forfeiture provision: Alabama,
ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§
13.75.020, 13.75.060 (Westlaw 2013); Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-831
(Westlaw 2013); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (Westlaw 2013);
California, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7100 (West 2007); Colorado, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-19-106, 15-19-109 (Westlaw 2013); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 497.005 (Westlaw 2013); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-21-7 (Westlaw
2013); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ -4, -6 (Westlaw 2013) (Laws 2013, Act 17)
(official classification pending); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-1142 (Westlaw
2013); Illinois, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 65/5, 65/20 (West 2007); Indiana,
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. §§
144C.5, 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A
(Westlaw 2013); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 37-19-904, 37-19-906 (Westlaw
2013); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:16–290:17 (Westlaw 2013);
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013); New York, N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2108.77,
2108.81 (Westlaw 2013); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1151a, 1158
(Westlaw 2013); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97.130 (Westlaw 2013);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-703 to 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013); Texas,
TEX. HEATH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.002 (West 2010), TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed and recodified as TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§
152.101–152.102 effective Jan. 1, 2014); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-9-602 to
58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5227–5228
(Westlaw 2013); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw
2013); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 30-6-22a (Westlaw 2013); Wisconsin,
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.30 (Westlaw 2013).
138. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
139. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
140. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.a.
141. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b.
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a. Limitations in the Reach of Forfeiture Provisions
The forfeiture provisions in some state statutes are drafted so as
to only apply to certain categories of persons granted the right of
disposition. For example, the disposition of remains statutes in
Florida and New Jersey call for forfeiture only in the case of spousal
murder. Florida’s statute provides:
(39) “Legally authorized person” means, in the priority
listed:
(a) The decedent, when written inter vivos
authorizations and directions are provided by the
decedent;
(b) [The person designed in a DD Form 93 as agent if
the deceased was a member of the Armed Forces,
Reserves, or National Guard when he or she died];
(c) The surviving spouse, unless the spouse has been
arrested for committing against the deceased an
act of domestic violence as defined in s. 741.28
that resulted in or contributed to the death of the
deceased;142
The rest of the next of kin follow, but there is no provision relating
to forfeiture in cases where a family member other than the spouse
is responsible for the victim’s death.
New Jersey’s forfeiture provision is likewise limited to spousal
disposition rights as a result of the provision’s placement. The
statute first provides that a decedent may appoint a person in a will
to control the disposition of remains.143 However, if no appointment
has been made and unless other directions have been given by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the right shall go to:
(1) The surviving spouse of the decedent or the surviving
civil union or domestic partner; except that if the
decedent had a temporary or permanent restraining
order issued . . . against the surviving spouse or civil
union or domestic partner, or the surviving spouse or
civil union or domestic partner is charged with the
intentional killing of the decedent, the right to control
the funeral and disposition of the remains shall be
granted to the next available priority class as provided
in this subsection.144
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005 (emphasis added).
143. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:27-22 (Westlaw 2013).
144. Id. (emphasis added).
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This limitation appears to be the result of oversight on the part of the
Legislature, as there is no justifiable reason to call for forfeiture only
in the case of spousal killings but not other familial homicides.
Moreover, the ill-considered placement of the forfeiture provision
in several statutes creates another limitation: The provision does not
take away rights if the victim specifically designated the slayer as an
agent to control disposition. For example, New Jersey’s statute
provides first that if a decedent appoints a person to control
disposition, the designee shall have priority over all other persons
upon the decedent’s death.145 The default order is applicable only if
no designation is made. However, the only provision providing for
forfeiture is listed within the default order.146 Consequently, the
forfeiture provision does not apply when a person appointed to
control disposition is the person who killed the decedent. This holds
true for Florida’s forfeiture provision as well.147 It is unlikely that
the state legislatures intended to create this loophole that allows a
slayer to retain the right to dispose of his or her victim’s remains if
the victim previously designated the slayer to act as his or her agent
for disposition.
Iowa’s forfeiture provision, in contrast, only calls for forfeiture
of a designee’s authority and does not extend to rights granted to a
person when no designation is made.148 It provides: “A designee
shall forfeit all rights and authority under a declaration . . . [if] [t]he
designee is charged with murder in the first or second degree or
voluntary manslaughter in connection with the declarant’s death and
those charges are known to a third party.”149 Thus, family members
granted the power of disposition by law rather than by specific
designation are not subject to forfeiture of their rights.150 While
Iowa’s provision remedies the defect present in Florida and New
Jersey’s statutes, it has the effect, again likely unintentional, of not
reaching slayers granted the right of disposition by statute rather
than by designation.
Another drafting choice that limits the impact of current
forfeiture provisions is that most state statutes require a person to be
charged with an offense relating to the death before forfeiture takes
place,151 though some states extend the application of forfeiture
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 497.005.
148. IOWA CODE ANN. § 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013).
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id. § 144C.5.
151. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 30-6-22a (Westlaw 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.30 (Westlaw 2013).
Tennessee’s forfeiture provision even requires a person be convicted before
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provisions to persons arrested in connection with the death.152
However, these statutes do not address situations in which a suspect
is on the run and not yet arrested or charged, or when there is good
cause to believe a person was involved in the killing but not yet
enough evidence to establish probable cause for an arrest. While an
arrest or charge provides additional assurance that the forfeiture is
justified, the forfeiture provisions of most states do not reach
individuals believed to be involved or responsible for the death who
have not yet been arrested or charged, which is problematic because
disposition decisions must be made shortly after the death.153
To address this situation one state, Vermont, goes so far as to
require forfeiture if the right holder is a person of interest and likely
to be prosecuted in connection with the decedent’s death.154 For
example, in the case of Stephen Shepherd, he was labeled a person
of interest and likely to be prosecuted during the time he was in
hiding before his arrest.155 In such situations, most forfeiture
provisions would still permit suspected slayers to retain the right to
dispose of their victims until the slayer has been formally charged.
While Vermont expanded the coverage of its forfeiture provision by
including “person of interest and likely to be prosecuted,” this
language could become problematic because the phrase “person of

forfeiture takes place. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013). See also
infra note 183 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 290:17 (Westlaw 2013); OR. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 97.130 (Westlaw 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160
(Westlaw 2013).
153. If not quickly buried or cremated, bodies will begin to decompose. If there
is a dispute, many state statutes authorize the funeral director to embalm or
refrigerate the body during the proceedings. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17102 (Westlaw 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-602 (Westlaw 2013). Such delay is
not only costly, with storage fees ranging from $35–$100 per day, Funeral Costs –
a detailed price breakdown, THE FUNERAL SITE, http://www.thefuneralsite.com
/ResourceCenters/Costs/How_much.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012), but it also
prolongs the emotional distress of the kin during such litigation and ultimately
keeps the victim from his or her final resting place. See Kester, supra note 20, at
588–89 (describing a case in which a body remained in storage for over five years
while next of kin disputed in court); see also infra notes 205–06 and
accompanying text.
154. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5228 (Westlaw 2013).
155. See T.J. Pignataro & Jay Rey, Husband Sought in Tonawanda Death:
Town Police Suspect Homicide After Wife’s Body is Found in House, The
BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9723003; Gene Warner
& T.J. Pignataro, Husband Arrested in Tonawanda Slaying: Found in Catskills
After a Nationwide Alert, Will be Charged with Murder, Town Police Say, THE
BUFFALO NEWS, May 22, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 9795915.
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interest” is not a formally defined term.156 However, if forfeiture
provisions only affect persons charged or arrested, suspected slayers
may still be granted the right to control the disposition of their
victims’ remains, with their families having no recourse to challenge
the authority.
b. Lack of Due Process Considerations
Although many states have automatic forfeiture provisions
within their disposition of remains statutes, few grant notice of the
forfeiture and an opportunity to challenge the presumption in a
meaningful and timely manner to an individual who has forfeited the
right of disposition. The absence of procedure to challenge the
forfeiture may constitute a due process violation, as disposition of
remains statutes grant a bundle of rights to the next of kin of
decedents.157 Though the right to dispose of remains is not a
traditional property right, this statutory entitlement may rise to the
level of a constitutionally protected interest.158
The New York State Legislature considered the possibility that
an alleged slayer may be wrongfully accused when it amended New
York’s disposition of remains law in 2012.159 As a result, the
Legislature included a provision allowing courts to waive the
application of forfeiture in certain instances.160 The statute provides
that the application of the forfeiture provision “may be waived . . . in
the interest of justice by order of . . . the court . . . in which the
criminal action . . . is pending . . . [or] if proceeding in that court
would cause inappropriate delay, a court in a special proceeding.”161
However, the statute provides little guidance as to when such waiver
may be appropriate or if a person must receive notice of the
forfeiture and the ability to challenge the deprivation. New York has
at least considered the procedural concerns when depriving a person
of a statutorily granted right; in contrast, most state statutes do not
contemplate this matter.
156. Dan Fletcher, What’s a ‘Person of Interest’?, TIME (Sept. 17, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1924318,00.html. See also BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1257 (A person of interest is “[a] person who is
the subject of a police investigation but who has not been identified by investigators
as being suspected of committing the crime itself.”).
157. See discussion infra Part III.B.
158. See discussion infra Part III.B.
159. See Video: Press Conference on Legislation to Protect Remains of Crime
Victims (NY SENATE 2012), available at http://www.nysenate.gov/video/2012
/may/15/video-press-conference-legislation-protect-remains-crime-victims.
160. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013).
161. Id. The statute also gives the ability to challenge the forfeiture to a person
who has forfeited the right due to an outstanding order of protection. Id.
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III. GUIDANCE FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The majority of state statutory regimes relating to the disposition
of remains currently fail both victims and surviving family
members, as they either do not call for forfeiture in the case of
murder or do not have comprehensive forfeiture provisions. The
maxim underlying the slayer rule that no man shall take advantage
of his own wrong should prevent slayers from having the right to
dispose of their victims’ remains, just as it does in the case of
prohibiting the inheritance of property or life insurance benefits. The
principles underlying the slayer rule also call for forfeiture of
disposition rights. Morally, there is sanctity in life. Equitably, the
slayer should not be granted a right by virtue of committing a crime.
Legally, a slayer should not be permitted to control the disposition
of a decedent’s remains by bringing about the death. Presumably a
victim would not want the person who took his or her life to make
important decisions regarding the victim’s final resting place. For
these reasons, a slayer should and can be prevented from having the
right to dispose of his or her victim’s remains.162
Every state must ensure not only that slayers are divested of the
right to control their victims’ final dispositions but also that families
of victims are not deprived of this right. Making disposition
arrangements is an integral part of the grieving process.163 Homicide
already victimizes survivors; their “trust in the world, spirituality,
and beliefs about social order and justice can be devastated.”164
Furthermore, this process of making disposition and funeral
arrangements often “assists survivors in coming to terms with the
loss and their grief, particularly where the death was unexpected.”165
When the victim’s family is deprived of this right and instead the
slayer is granted control of the disposition, both the survivors and
the decedent are victimized a second time.

162. A slayer may choose to vindictively inflict more pain on the survivors by
refusing to relinquish the body to the family and making decisions contrary to the
victim’s wishes. See, e.g., Video: Press Conference on Legislation to Protect
Remains of Crime Victims (NY SENATE 2012), available at http://www.nysenate
.gov/video/2012/may/15/video-press-conference-legislation-protect-remains-crime
-victims.
163. Hernández, supra note 58, at 991–92.
164. OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FIRST RESPONSE
TO VICTIMS OF CRIME: A GUIDEBOOK FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 53
(2010), available at http://www.ovc.gov/publications/infores/pdftxt/2010First
ResponseGuidebook.pdf.
165. Hernández, supra note 58, at 991.

2013]

COMMENT

239

A. Determining the Proper Scope of Forfeiture Provisions
To protect victims’ families and to keep such personal matters
out of the hands of slayers, every state should extend the reasoning
behind the slayer rule to provide for forfeiture of slayers’ rights to
dispose of their victims’ remains.166 But it is not enough that a
disposition of remains statute contain a forfeiture provision. While
the language and coverage of statutes may vary by state, the
following fundamental requirements should be considered: (1) a
clear order and priority of all persons who may be vested with the
right to control disposition, whether by designation or by law; (2) an
effective forfeiture provision that is triggered when any person
granted the right is a suspect likely to be prosecuted, arrested, or
charged with murder or voluntary manslaughter; and (3) a
requirement that a person deprived of the right be afforded notice
and a meaningful opportunity to challenge the forfeiture.
1. Ensuring All Potential Right Holders Are Subject to
Forfeiture
When discussing familial homicides, spousal homicides are
often the first category that comes to mind. The disposition of
remains statutes in Florida and New Jersey are evidence of this, as
their forfeiture clauses apply only to spouses, not other family
members.167 However, 12% of homicide victims are killed by other
family members.168 Thus, a family member may be criminally
responsible for a decedent’s death and yet still be vested with the
right to control the disposition of the decedent’s remains, for
example, if the victim is unmarried or divorced. Consequently,
forfeiture provisions must be positioned within disposition of
remains statutes so as to affect all persons with the authority to
control disposition, whether a spouse or any other person granted
the right of disposition. States can easily ensure forfeiture provisions
are applicable to all categories of potential right holders by first
listing a clear order and priority of persons entitled to the right of
166. This Comment focuses on the need for forfeiture in instances when the
person granted the right of disposition is criminally responsible for the decedent’s
death. However, many states choose to require forfeiture in other instances as well,
for example, if there is an outstanding order of protection against an individual at
the time of the decedent’s death or if an individual vested with the right declines to
act, is unable to act, does not act within a certain time period, or cannot be found.
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 2013); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2108.75 (Westlaw 2013).
167. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
168. Cooper, supra note 22, at 16.
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disposition, then calling for forfeiture in the case of anyone vested
with the right by virtue of the statute.169
For example, Indiana’s disposition of remains statute states:
“Except as provided in subsection (b), the following persons, in the
order of priority indicated, have the authority to designate the
manner, type, and selection of the final disposition of human
remains.”170 After listing designated agents and all next of kin,
subsection (b) then contains the statute’s forfeiture provision.171 By
drafting the statute in this manner, Indiana avoided the flaw present
in Florida’s and New Jersey’s statutes: The forfeiture provision is
applicable to any person who is granted the right of disposition, not
just a spouse.
In addition to affecting all persons granted the right of
disposition through the default order of priority, forfeiture
provisions must also apply to right holders designated as agents for
disposition. Presumably a victim would not want a person who
brought about his or her death to control the disposition of the
victim’s remains, even if that person was previously designated as
an agent to determine disposition, a power of attorney, or a designee
to carry out the decedent’s wishes. For this reason, forfeiture
provisions should be crafted and positioned so that they divest
slayers of the right to control disposition, no matter how or when
such right is vested. By comprehensively covering all ways by
which disposition rights can be vested, a forfeiture provision will
effectively prevent slayers from controlling the disposition of their
victims’ remains.172
The forfeiture provision in the Arkansas Final Disposition
Rights Act of 2009 successfully applies to anyone granted the right
of disposition, including designated agents. Under section (d)(1), the
Act covers the order and priority of all persons who could
potentially be vested with the right to control disposition, whether
appointed by the decedent or granted the right by the default
statutory order.173 Then, section (e)(1) contains the forfeiture
provision, which provides: “A person entitled under this section to
the right of disposition shall forfeit that right” in certain instances,
including murder.174 Because the Act addresses all ways by which
disposition rights can be bestowed and applies to all manners of
disposition, the forfeiture provision within the Arkansas Final
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See, e.g., Appendix subsections (B)–(C).
IND. CODE ANN. § 25-15-9-18 (Westlaw 2013) (emphasis added).
Id.
See, e.g., Appendix subsections (B)–(C).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-102 (Westlaw 2013).
Id.
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Disposition Rights Act of 2009 effectively divests slayers of
disposition rights in any potential scenario.175
In reforming their laws, state legislatures should take care to
make sure forfeiture provisions affect all relevant statutes. Often,
statutes concerning the designation of an agent are distinct from
general disposition of remains statutes.176 Accordingly, every
applicable statute relating to disposition should reflect a forfeiture
provision in order to ensure that the law is consistent and slayers are
not granted disposition rights as a result of drafting oversight and
conflicting statutes.177
2. Establishing When Forfeiture Should Take Place
Of the state statutes containing forfeiture provisions, most provide
for forfeiture in the case of murder and voluntary manslaughter.178
When drafting the forfeiture provision, states may look to their
respective slayer statutes for guidance as to which grounds should
necessitate forfeiture. The nomenclature of specific crimes varies by
state179 as does the list of offenses encompassed within slayer
statutes;180 thus, a state’s forfeiture provision language should mirror
that of its slayer statute.
But unlike the application of slayer statutes and the resulting
deprivation of property that can take place after a trial or a civil
determination,181 disposition decisions must be made soon after the

175. Id.
176. This also holds true for statutes relating to anatomical gifts, preneed funeral
or cremation contracts, duties of burial, authorization for cremation, declaration of
instructions in a will or otherwise, and also designation of an agent for disposition of
remains. See, e.g., Jonathan Spralding Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-6B (Westlaw 2013); Id. § 24-12A-1 (“Right to authorize
cremation; definition”); Id. § 24-12A-2 (“No written instructions; priority of others
to decide disposition”); Id. § 45-3-701 (“Time of accrual of duties and powers”); Id.
§ 61-32-19 (“Cremation; requirements; right to authorize cremation; disposition of
cremains”).
177. For example, a state’s statute relating to burial rights may provide for
forfeiture while the statute relating to cremation authorization does not.
178. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 144C.8 (Westlaw 2013); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-9-603 (Westlaw 2013).
179. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-603 (“voluntary manslaughter”);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-906 (Westlaw 2013) (“deliberate or negligent
homicide”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 68.50.160 (Westlaw 2013) (“first degree
manslaughter”).
180. For example, some states extend forfeiture to include non-felonious
homicides. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT §
45 (2011).
181. Id.
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commission of the crime.182 Thus, the forfeiture provision must
specify when the forfeiture is triggered, as final arrangements
ordinarily take place prior to the determination of criminal guilt.183
Most of the currently enacted forfeiture provisions require a person
to either be arrested or charged before forfeiture takes place.184
However, states should expand their forfeiture provisions to include
a suspect likely to be prosecuted in connection with the death.185
Both the timing of disposition decisions and the potential delays
involved in building a case to file charges justify such an extension.
As opposed to the term “person of interest,” “suspect” is formally
defined, so there would be less ambiguity surrounding when
forfeiture would apply.186 By crafting forfeiture provisions to reach
suspects likely to be prosecuted as well as those arrested or charged
with murder or voluntary manslaughter, disposition rights will be
kept out of the hands of those believed to be involved or responsible
for the death, even if not yet arrested187 or under prosecution.188
182. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
183. Tennessee’s forfeiture provision currently requires a person be convicted
of an offense in connection with the decedent’s death before forfeiture takes place.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-704 (Westlaw 2013). However, disposition decisions
are generally made soon after death. Accordingly, such a provision may result in
either extensive delays in the disposition due to prolonged criminal proceedings or
in alleged slayers controlling the disposition of their victims’ remains before being
convicted.
184. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.a.
185. A suspect is “[a] person believed to have committed a crime or offense.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 1584. The statute must also require
that a suspect who has forfeited the right of disposition receive notice of the
forfeiture and have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the forfeiture. See
discussion infra Part III.B.
186. Fletcher, supra note 156.
187. For example, in Texas the right of disposition is automatically forfeited if
“an indictment has been filed charging the person with a crime . . . that involves
family violence against the decedent.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
711.002 (West 2010). However, Texas has another statute that provides that “[t]he
executor of a decedent’s will or the decedent’s next of kin may file an application
for an order limiting the right of the decedent’s surviving spouse to control the
decedent’s burial or cremation.” TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 152.101 (Westlaw 2013)
(effective Jan. 1, 2014).
If the court finds that there is good cause to believe that the decedent’s
surviving spouse is the principal or an accomplice in a willful act that
resulted in the decedent’s death, the court may, after notice and a hearing,
limit the surviving spouse’s right to control the decedent’s burial or
cremation.
Id. § 152.102 (effective Jan. 1, 2014). The currently enacted law is substantively
identical. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed effective Jan. 1,
2014).
188. Most forfeiture provisions also require that the status of the investigation,
arrest, or prosecution be known to the funeral service or crematory practitioner in
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B. Safeguarding Due Process Rights
Just as the rights of victims and families are of high importance,
so too are the rights of the accused. An alleged slayer should have
the ability to challenge the forfeiture of the right of disposition, not
only for policy reasons because a conviction has not yet taken place
but also to satisfy procedural due process concerns that are likely
implicated when depriving a person of the right of disposition.189
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”190 While bodies are not

order to protect practitioners from liability. In practice, after the medical examiner
determines the cause and manner of death, the victim’s family is contacted to
determine what arrangements should be made. Telephone Interview with Bobby
Ducote, Funeral Home Manager, Schoen Funeral Home (Oct. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter Decote Interview]. See N.H. REV. STAT. § 5-C:66 (Westlaw 2013)
(“When a funeral director, next of kin, or designated agent is requested to take
custody of a body, he or she shall first ascertain whether a pronouncing physician,
pronouncing registered nurse, APRN, or a medical examiner has established the
cause of death and released the body for final disposition.”). The body is then
transferred from the morgue to the funeral establishment or crematory. During this
process, communication takes place between the medical examiner, the family
member who releases the body, and the practitioner; the cause and manner of
death is communicated to the practitioner, as it must be listed on the death
certificate. Decote Interview, supra. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3705.16
(Westlaw 2013) (“Each death . . . shall be registered . . . by the funeral director or
other person in charge of the final disposition of the remains. The funeral director .
. . shall present the . . . death certificate to the attending physician of the decedent,
the coroner, or the medical examiner, as appropriate for certification of the cause
of death.”).
189. There are two general categories of due process: substantive due process
and procedural due process. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 (Westlaw
2013). Whereas substantive due process prohibits governmental interference with
rights rooted in the concept of liberty, procedural due process “requires
government action resulting in the deprivation of a liberty or property interest to
be implemented in a fair manner.” Id. The central issue that arises with forfeiture
provisions is whether there are constitutionally adequate procedures surrounding
the deprivation, not whether the state has the power to deprive someone of the
right of disposition. See id. §§ 1443–1444. Accordingly, this Comment addresses
procedural due process instead of substantive due process.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Forfeiture provisions in disposition of remains
laws clearly constitute a deprivation under the color of state law since the
deprivation is provided for by state statute. Thus, the remaining questions are
whether forfeiture of the right of disposition qualifies as a deprivation of a
protectable interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and, if so,
“whether the state afforded constitutionally adequate process for the deprivation.”
Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Parratt v.
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 536–37 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v.
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treated as property in the traditional sense, the next of kin are
entitled to certain statutory rights in remains.191 Consequently, the
issue at hand is whether the deprivation of a statutorily granted right
of disposition in remains is an interest entitled to procedural due
process protection.192
Because property interests are created by state law and not by the
Constitution, courts look to applicable state law to determine whether
a property interest exists.193 However, “federal constitutional law
determines whether that interest rises to the level of a ‘legitimate
claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process Clause.”194 Thus,
the determination of whether the right of disposition is protected by
the Due Process Clause does not depend on whether the state
classifies the interest in remains as property, quasi-property, or not
property,195 but “whether [the substance of] that interest rises to the
level of a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause.”196 All states have disposition of remains
statutes granting a bundle of rights in a decedent’s remains to the
next of kin;197 therefore, states have created a statutory entitlement
and legal interest that is likely protectable under the Constitution.
Indeed, numerous courts have come to this same conclusion and

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)). States must also ensure that any laws enacted are
in compliance with state constitutions.
191. See discussion supra Part II.A.
192. “‘Liberty’ and ‘property’ are broad and majestic terms. They are among
the ‘[g]reat [constitutional] concepts . . . purposely left to gather meaning from
experience . . . .’” Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972)
(alterations in original) (quoting Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). Although it is conceivable
that the right of disposition could constitute a liberty interest, this seeming
difficulty of categorizing the right as a liberty or property interest can be avoided
for the purposes of this Comment, as both are entitled to procedural due process
protections. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1444 (Westlaw 2013) (“When a state
action threatens to deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest, a
person is entitled to procedural due process.”).
193. Roth, 408 U.S. at 571 (“Property interests, of course, are not created by
the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law . . . .”).
194. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978) (citing
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972)).
195. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that
the identification of property interests for due process purposes turns on the
substance of the interest recognized, not the name given to that interest by the
state).
196. Id. at 481–82 (quoting Memphis Light, 436 U.S. at 9).
197. See supra notes 91, 137.
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have found that the right of disposition is a constitutionally
protected interest.198
In order to avoid potential due process violations, states should
provide an avenue to ensure that the deprivation is executed in a fair
manner.199 Due process is a flexible concept that differs depending
on a particular situation,200 but “[t]he fundamental requirement of
due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.’”201 The Supreme Court has consistently
“held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is
finally deprived of a property interest.”202 Yet, most states with
forfeiture provisions currently do not provide any procedure
allowing an alleged slayer to challenge the deprivation, which would
likely constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of a protectable
interest since no determination of guilt has yet been made.203
Accordingly, states should amend their disposition of remains
statutes to require a person statutorily deprived of the right of
disposition to be given notice of the deprivation as well as the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.
To adequately protect due process rights, forfeiture hearings
should take place quickly before any action is taken with respect to
198. See Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
Louisiana has established a quasi-property right in remains and also finding that
there were adequate state post-deprivation procedures); Whaley v. County of
Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that the next of kin have a
constitutionally protected property interest in a decedent’s remains); Brotherton,
923 F.2d at 482 (holding that the aggregate of rights granted to the next of kin rose
to the level of a legitimate claim of entitlement); Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,
287 F.3d 786, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the exclusive right of the next
of kin to dispose of remains created a property interest entitled to due process
protection); Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So. 2d 978, 988 (Fla. 2001) (holding “that in
Florida there is a legitimate claim of entitlement by the next of kin to possession of
the remains of a decedent for burial or other lawful disposition”).
199. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1505 (Westlaw 2013).
200. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990).
201. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
202. Id. To determine whether an administrative procedure comports with the
Due Process Clause, a court must weigh the three factors identified by the
Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335.
203. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.b.
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the disposition of remains.204 This is because disposition decisions
must be made shortly after death,205 and such decisions are often
irreversible.206 State legislatures may choose which court they wish
to be the proper forum for deciding such matters based upon which
court in their jurisdiction is best suited to handle disposition
disputes.207 Reasonable alternatives include the probate court, circuit
court, or district court.208 Currently, some states do allow family
members to petition the court to divest an alleged slayer of the right
of disposition.209 However, instead of requiring a victim’s grieving
family to use time, resources, and effort to revoke such rights from a
slayer, automatic forfeiture provisions laying out an avenue to
challenge the forfeiture in a hearing would be far more effectual.210
Allowing a person deprived of the right of disposition the ability to
contest the forfeiture adequately protects the due process rights of
alleged slayers while also preventing any unnecessary burdens on
victims’ families and the court system.

204. “[N]o fixed format, process, or procedure is demanded for a due process
hearing . . . .” 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 1001 (Westlaw 2013). The
exact nature of the due process hearing for cases involving the forfeiture of the
right of disposition is beyond the scope of this Comment.
205. “The law in most states requires that all bodies be buried shortly after
death.” Brian L. Josias, Burying the Hatchet in Burial Disputes: Applying
Alternative Dispute Resolution to Disputes Concerning the Interment of Bodies, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1141, 1145 (2004) (footnote omitted). Accordingly,
disposition disputes “demand quick action” because “[b]odies must be buried,
organs must be harvested, and healing for the next of kin must begin.” Id. at 1166.
206. Cremation is an irreversible method of disposition, and “[b]urial choices,
once made, are often difficult if not impossible to reverse. If interment is the
preferred method, laws in many states have stringent prohibitions on the
exhumation of bodies. These laws make interment almost as irreversible as
cremation in terms of long-term ramifications.” Id. at 1146 (footnote omitted).
207. Kester, supra note 20, at 613–14.
208. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-13-11 (Westlaw 2013) (probate court); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.3208 (Westlaw 2013) (circuit court); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 37-19-906 (Westlaw 2013) (district court).
209. See, e.g., TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 115 (West 2003) (repealed and
recodified as TEX. EST. CODE ANN. §§ 152.101–152.102 effective Jan. 1, 2014);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 213.420 (Westlaw 2013).
210. The bringing of a dispute creates unnecessary burdens on the family.
Right of disposition disputes “can make the loss of a loved one more difficult and
can carry on for years after the death.” Theresa E. Ellis, Loved and Lost: Breathing
Life into the Rights of Noncustodial Parents, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 293 (2005).
Furthermore, “[e]nsuring fulfillment of the burial wishes of a deceased loved one
should not require . . . surviving kin to enter into time-consuming and costly
litigation.” Josias, supra note 205, at 1181. The survivors have already been
victimized by losing their loved one—they should not be further required to
challenge the right to make arrangements and to control his or her disposition.
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CONCLUSION
Legislatures have the power to prevent murder victims from being
victimized after death and their survivors from being wronged a
second time by ensuring that final disposition rights do not fall into
the hands of slayers. The solution is a simple one—a disposition of
remains statute containing a provision that calls for forfeiture if the
person with the right to control disposition is a suspect likely to be
prosecuted, arrested, or charged in connection with the decedent’s
death. So long as there is a means for the accused to challenge the
forfeiture in a timely manner, the statute will adequately protect due
process rights as well as victims’ families who may otherwise have to
watch their loved ones be disposed of by their slayers. Slayers should
not be permitted to take advantage of their wrongdoing, and state
statutes should not be the source granting slayers the right to do so.
State legislatures must fight against domestic violence and amend
their disposition of remains statutes to adequately protect victims and
their families from the tragic consequence of flawed statutes—
slayers determining the final resting place of their victims.
Minia E. Bremenstul∗
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APPENDIX: MODEL DISPOSITION OF REMAINS STATUTE
Below is a comprehensive model statute regarding the right to
control the disposition of a decedent’s remains. Subsections (B) and
(C) address the problems presented in this Comment. Subsection (B)
contains a clear order and priority of persons granted the right of
disposition—including both disposition by declaration211 and
disposition by law.212 Thus, all potential avenues for an individual to
be granted the right of disposition are provided for in one location,
and the order and priority of persons entitled to make disposition
decisions is clearly delineated.213 Subsection (C) then contains the
forfeiture provision, which unambiguously applies to any and all
persons possessing the right of disposition as granted by Subsection
(B).214 It also requires that the person subject to forfeiture be
afforded notice and an opportunity to challenge the forfeiture in a
timely manner.215
The model statute also covers additional issues concerning the
disposition of remains, including relevant definitions,216 other
instances when forfeiture of the right of disposition may be
appropriate,217 guidance for court determinations of disposition
disputes,218 and provisions limiting practitioner liability.219
Right to Control the Disposition of a Decedent’s Remains
(A) Definitions. As used in this section, unless the context
otherwise clearly indicates, the following words and phrases
shall have the meaning hereinafter ascribed to each:
(1) “Declarant” means a competent adult who signs a
declaration pursuant to the provisions of this article.
(2) “Declaration instrument” means a written legal document
executed by a competent adult to provide instructions as to
final disposition and/or to appoint a designated agent(s) to
211. Disposition by declaration refers to the decedent providing instructions
through a declaration instrument as to his or her disposition, as well as the
decedent designating an agent to control his or her disposition through a
declaration instrument. See Appendix subsection (B)(1)–(2).
212. Disposition by law occurs in the absence of a declaration or designation.
See Appendix subsection (B). The question of the exact priority and order of
persons delegated authority is beyond the scope of this Comment.
213. See Appendix subsection (B).
214. See Appendix subsection (C).
215. See Appendix subsection (C).
216. See Appendix subsection (A).
217. See Appendix subsection (C).
218. See Appendix subsection (D).
219. See Appendix subsection (E).
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control the decedent’s disposition. A declaration instrument
shall be in writing, contain the date of its execution, be
signed by the declarant, and notarized or witnessed in
writing by at least one adult, other than the designated
agent, who affirms that he or she was present when the
legally competent adult signed and dated the document and
that the legally competent adult appeared to be of sound
mind and free from duress at the time of execution of the
document. United States Department of Defense Record of
Emergency Data Forms (DD Form 93) as well as prepaid
funeral, burial, or cremation contracts also qualify as
declaration instruments. The provisions of the most recent
declaration instrument shall control over any other
document regarding the disposition of remains. However,
neither an anatomical gift document nor a declaration
instrument shall invalidate the other in its entirety. If the
two documents conflict, the more recent document shall
control as to the conflicting provisions.
(3) “Final disposition” means the final disposal of a decedent’s
remains, which may include burial, aboveground interment,
cremation, burial at sea, delivery to a medical institution for
lawful dissection if the medical institution assumes
responsibility for disposal, or other lawful disposition.
(4) “Practitioner” refers to funeral directors, funeral service
providers, cemetery authorities, and crematory authorities.
(5) “Reasonably ascertainable” means the individual is able to
be contacted without undue effort and willing and able to
act in a timely manner.
(6) “Right of disposition” means the right to make all
decisions, consistent with applicable laws, regarding the
handling of a decedent’s remains.
(B) Right of disposition. The right to control the disposition of a
decedent’s remains vests in and devolves upon the following
persons, at the time of the decedent’s death, in the following
order, except as provided in subsection (C):
(1) the decedent, if providing disposition instructions through a
valid declaration instrument;
(2) the decedent’s designated agent(s) to control final
disposition, if designated in a valid declaration instrument.
If the designated agent is a spouse, a subsequent divorce,
annulment, or legal separation automatically revokes the
delegation, unless otherwise provided in the declaration
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instrument or if the decedent appointed the spouse after the
date of such divorce, annulment, or separation;220
(3) the surviving spouse, domestic partner, or civil union
partner, unless legally separated or a divorce or legal
separation is pending;
(4) the majority of the surviving adult children of the decedent
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable;
(5) the surviving parents or legal guardians of the decedent
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable, unless
parental rights have been terminated by court order;
(6) a majority of the surviving adult siblings of the decedent
whose whereabouts are reasonably ascertainable;
(7) any adult person in the next degree of kinship in the order
named by the law to inherit the decedent’s estate;
(8) any other person willing to assume the responsibilities to
act and arrange the final disposition of the decedent’s
remains, including the personal representative of the
decedent’s estate or the funeral practitioner with the
custody of the remains, after attesting in writing that a good
faith effort has been made to no avail to contact the
individuals listed above.
A person under this section shall act pursuant to any disposition
wishes of the decedent, to the extent that they are known.
(C) Forfeiture of the right of disposition.221 Any individual granted
the right to control the disposition of a decedent’s remains
under subsection (B) forfeits this right and the right is passed
on to the next qualifying person or persons under subsection
(B) in the following circumstances:
(1) the individual vested with the right declines to act, is unable
to act because of death or disability, cannot be located after
a good faith effort to do so within forty-eight hours after the
time of death or the discovery of the body, or the individual
does not exercise the right within three days of notification
of the decedent’s death or within five days of the decedent’s
death, whichever is earlier;
(2) the individual was the subject of an order of protection at
the time of the decedent’s death, or is identified by a law
enforcement agency as a suspect likely to be prosecuted or
is arrested or charged with first or second degree murder or
220. This provision is derived from Delaware’s statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 268 (West 2006).
221. Much of this subsection is derived from Vermont’s statute relating to
forfeiture of the right to determine the disposition of a decedent’s remains. VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5228 (Westlaw 2013).
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voluntary manslaughter in connection with the decedent’s
death, if the status of the investigation, arrest, or charge is
known to the practitioner, except the right shall be returned
to the individual in the following circumstances:
(a) if the prosecution is not pursued or the individual is
acquitted of the alleged crime before the remains are
disposed of; or
(b) if, after the individual is afforded notice and an
opportunity to appear in person or by counsel, or both,
at a timely hearing on the matter, the court of
competent jurisdiction determines that the forfeiture is
not in the interest of justice;
(3) if the court of competent jurisdiction determines that,
pursuant to subsection (D), another person is most fit and
appropriate to carry out the right of disposition; or
(4) as otherwise ordered by the court of competent jurisdiction.
(D) Court determination.222 Notwithstanding other provisions of
this section, the court of competent jurisdiction in the state of
the decedent’s domicile may determine the individual(s) most
fit and appropriate to control the disposition of the decedent’s
remains or resolve a dispute regarding the disposition of the
decedent’s remains. It may also choose to set aside forfeiture of
the right of disposition in the interest of justice.
(1) The following persons may file a petition in the court of
competent jurisdiction:
(a) before a decedent’s death, the decedent or the
decedent’s legal representative;
(b) a relative of the decedent;
(c) a person who claims and establishes through evidence
that the person had a closer personal relationship to the
decedent than the next of kin;
(d) the person subject to forfeiture of the right of disposition
pursuant to subsection (C); or
(e) the funeral service or crematory practitioner with
custody of the remains.
(2) In making its decision as to the individual most fit and
appropriate to control disposition or to resolve a dispute
regarding disposition, the court shall consider the following
factors:
(a) the decedent’s expressed or known directions or wishes;
(b) the decedent’s religious affiliation or beliefs;
222. This subsection contains statutory provisions from Maine and Vermont.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A (Westlaw 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
5231 (Westlaw 2013).
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(c) the cost and practicality of the proposed arrangements
and disposition and the ability of the responsible party
or parties to pay for the proposed arrangements and
disposition;
(d) the relationship between the decedent and any
individual claiming the right of disposition, including
whether the individual and the decedent were
estranged or had a relationship characterized by
hostility or violence;
(e) whether the proposed arrangements are inclusive of the
desires of the family;
(f) the degree to which the arrangements will allow
maximum participation by all wishing to pay respect;
and
(g) any other information the court, in its discretion, deems
relevant.
(E) Practitioner liability.223 The following provisions apply to the
actions and liability of funeral directors, funeral service
practitioners, cemetery authorities, or crematory authorities and
their employees.
(1) If there is a dispute regarding the right of disposition, the
practitioner may refuse to accept, inter, or otherwise
dispose of the remains until the practitioner is provided with
a court order or the parties to the action submit a final
stipulation approved by the court regarding the disposition
of remains.
(2) If there is a dispute regarding the right of disposition, the
practitioner who has physical possession of the remains
may embalm or refrigerate and shelter the remains while
the action is pending. The costs shall be the responsibility
of the party or parties who contracted with the practitioner,
the person or entity who is otherwise liable for the costs of
final disposition, or the estate as ordered by the court, or
any combination of these, and the court may include in the
order a decision concerning which of these shall be
responsible for paying these costs.
(3) If a practitioner commences an action under this section, the
practitioner may ask the court to include an order against
the estate or the parties for reasonable legal fees and costs.
(4) A practitioner is not required to independently investigate
to determine who has the right of disposition or who is next
of kin.
223. This subsection contains statutory provisions from Maine and Vermont.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5231.
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(5) A practitioner who, in good faith, acts upon the instructions
of the party it reasonably believes holds the right of
disposition shall not be held civilly or criminally liable, or
be subject to disciplinary action, for acting in accordance
with those instructions.

